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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Across the nation, lawyers routinely represent children who enter the 
juvenile court system.  Juvenile court systems typically handle two types of 
cases:  delinquency and dependency.1  Delinquency refers to those cases 
where children are accused of wrongdoing, which generally means a criminal 
                                                 
 * Associate Professor, Atlanta’s John Marshall Law School; J.D., George Washington University 
Law School; A.B., Dartmouth College.  I am grateful to Melissa Carter, Wayne Grannis, Michael B. Kent, 
Jr., Dayna Royal and Jeffrey A. Van Detta for their support, insight, and thoughtful comments on earlier 
drafts.  I also thank Lina Lozano, Candace Malone, Gail Oldt and Shaheem Williams, for valuable 
research assistance.       
 1. Some states have combined juvenile and family court systems.  Family courts generally handle 
divorce, child custody and other domestic law matters, which are not the subject of the article. 
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offense.  Dependency cases involve situations where the child is alleged to be 
mistreated, i.e. abused or neglected, by parents or guardians. 
Lawyers are involved in both types of proceedings most traditionally as 
representatives of the state.  Lawyers represent the state and bring forth 
charges of criminal conduct against the child in delinquency proceedings.  
Lawyers represent the state and bring forth allegations of abuse and neglect 
against the parents or guardians of the child in dependency proceedings.  In 
both types of proceedings, lawyers function as advocates for the state’s 
position.  Lawyers are also appointed to represent parents in dependency 
matters and function as advocates for their clients, by protecting the 
fundamental rights and interests of parents in these cases where parental 
rights are directly at issue.  
The right to counsel for children in juvenile court proceedings is a 
relatively recent phenomenon.  Prior to 1967, children did not have a right to 
counsel in juvenile court.2  In 1967, the U.S. Supreme Court in In re Gault 
held that children in juvenile delinquency proceedings have due process 
rights, including the right to counsel.3  A few years later in 1974, Congress 
enacted the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (“CAPTA”) which 
mandated that states appoint representatives for children in abuse and neglect 
proceedings in order to receive federal child abuse prevention and treatment 
funding.4  For over four decades, the roles, duties and responsibilities of the 
child’s attorney in juvenile court have been the subject of extensive debate 
and discussion among scholars, judges and practitioners.5  Currently, a 
general consensus exists that in delinquency matters, children have a right to 
counsel who functions as a legal advocate in the traditional sense.6  However, 
the right to counsel and the role of the counsel in dependency proceedings 
continues to be the subject of debate.7 
                                                 
 2. From the late 1800s until the mid-1900s, children had no legal rights in juvenile court proceedings.  
For a comprehensive discussion of the history of child welfare law, see DONALD N. DUQUETTE & ANN 
M. HARALAMBIE, CHILD WELFARE LAW AND PRACTICE, 163–97 (2d ed. 2010). 
 3. 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967). 
 4. 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2)(B)(xiii) (2010).  
 5. See, e.g., Donald N. Duquette, Legal Representation for Children in Protection Proceedings: Two 
Distinct Lawyer Roles are Required, 34 FAM L.Q. 441 (2000); Linda D. Elrod, Client-Directed Lawyers 
for Children: It is the “Right” Thing to Do, 27 PACE L. REV. 869 (2007); Martin Guggenheim, The Right 
to Be Represented But Not Heard: Reflections on Legal Representation for Children, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
76 (1984) [hereinafter Guggenheim I]; Jacob L. Isaacs, The Role of the Lawyer in Representing Minors in 
the New Family Court, 12 BUFF. L. REV. 501, 519 (1963); Jean Koh Peters, The Roles and Content of Best 
Interests in Client-Directed Lawyering for Children in Child Protective Proceedings, 64 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1505, 1513 (1996); Merril Sobie, The Child Client: Representing Children in Child Protective 
Proceedings, 22 TOURO L. REV. 745 (2006); Marvin R. Ventrell, Rights & Duties: An Overview of the 
Attorney-child Client Relationship, 26 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 259 (1995). 
 6. See Alberto Bernabe, The Right to Counsel Denied: Confusing the Roles of Lawyers and 
Guardians, 43 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 833, 838 (2012); Katherine Hunt Federle, Lawyering in Juvenile Court: 
Lessons from a Civil Gideon Experiment, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 93, 105 (2010); Kristin Henning, 
Loyalty, Paternalism and Rights: Client Counseling Theory and the Role of Child’s Counsel in 
Delinquency Cases, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 245, 260 (2005).   
 7. See, e.g., Annette Ruth Appell, Representing Children Representing What?: Critical Reflections on 
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In delinquency proceedings, where children are charged with committing 
criminal acts, lawyers are directed to advocate as traditional attorneys, giving 
voice to their clients’ positions and protecting their clients’ liberty interests 
and due process rights.8  In dependency proceedings, where children are 
alleged to be the victims of abuse or neglect, lawyers are often instructed to 
function as guardians ad litem.9  
Guardians ad litem act as arms of the court and recommend to the court 
what they determine and believe to be in the best interests of the child.10  
Guardians ad litem are not bound by the ethical obligations of lawyers to 
follow the client directives and, accordingly, take a paternalistic view of the 
representation of the child.11  Paternalism is inherent to the guardian ad litem 
model of representation.  The guardians ad litem interject their own personal 
views and substitute their judgments for the child in reaching a “best 
interests” conclusion.12  Such paternalism is at odds with the traditional 
advocacy approach to legal representation.13  The guardian ad litem model, 
which requires lawyers to represent the best interests of their clients as 
opposed to their clients’ positions, also leads to role confusion and 
ineffective lawyering.14   
The expanding recognition that children have procedural and substantive 
due process rights in juvenile court proceedings has led to the evolution of 
the juvenile court into a rights-based system.  Consequently, counsel for 
children in dependency proceedings must function as lawyers who protect 
the legal rights of the child clients and who advocate for the counseled 
positions of the clients.  Lawyers who function as traditional advocates are 
necessary to protect the due process rights of litigants and to effectuate a 
rights-based system.15   
In order for the dependency court to effectively operate as a rights-based 
court and to protect the fundamental liberty interests and due process rights 
of children who come before it, the role of counsel must be clear.  In 
dependency proceedings, a child’s right to counsel should mean a right to 
                                                                                                                   
Lawyering for Children, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 573 (2008); Barbara A. Atwood, Representing 
Children Who Can’t or Won’t Direct Counsel: Best interests Lawyering or No Lawyer At All?, 53 ARIZ. 
L. REV. 381 (2011) [hereinafter Atwood I]. 
 8. Federle, supra note 6, at 104. 
 9. Id. at 109.  
 10. Leonard P. Edwards & Inger J. Sagatun, Who Speaks for the Child?, 2 U. CHI. L. SCH. 
ROUNDTABLE 67, 72 (1995). 
 11. LaShonda Taylor, A Lawyer for Every Child: Client-Directed Representation in Dependency 
Cases, 47 FAM. CT. REV. 605, 618–19 (2009). 
 12. Henning, supra note 6, at 288–89, 309; see also Ellen Marrus, Best Interests Equals Zealous 
Advocacy: A Not So Radical View of Holistic Representation For Children Accused of Crime, 62 MD. L. 
REV. 288, 295 (2003). 
 13. Henning, supra note 6, at 288–89.  
 14. Bernabe, supra note 6, at 863–64; Robert E. Shepherd & Sharon S. England, “I Know the Child is 
My Client, But Who Am I?”, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1917, 1918, 1933–34 (1996). 
 15. Federle, supra note 6, at 110; Ventrell, supra note 5, at 269–73. 
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counsel who functions as an advocate, not as a guardian ad litem. 
Part II of this article discusses the background of the juvenile court 
system by explaining the parens patriae paradigm and the development of 
the right to counsel for children in delinquency and dependency proceedings.  
Part III evaluates the two different models of representation that have 
developed in the dependency area, the best-interest/guardian ad litem lawyer 
and the traditional client-directed lawyer.  This part also discusses the 
general problems with each model.  Part IV proposes that the dichotomy 
between the two models is false and must be overcome in order for children 
in dependency proceedings to receive effective representation. 
 
II.  BACKGROUND 
 
A. The Parens Patriae Paradigm 
 
Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in In re Gault, juvenile courts took 
an informal approach to resolving cases.16  A system of parens patriae17 
governed the juvenile court, which viewed its role as the protector of the 
helpless or less fortunate.18  The court held a paternalistic view of children 
because of their status as minors and because of societal concerns for child 
welfare.19  These first juvenile courts did not recognize children as 
individuals with rights or liberty interests.  Children did not require due 
process because they had no rights and the state had complete authority to 
determine how best to care for them.20  Courts thus dictated the appropriate 
outcomes for children without regard for the child’s rights and without 
consideration of the child’s point of view.21  Judges relied instead on their 
own views of what was best for the child and thus maintained a paternalistic 
approach to the resolution of child cases.22   
                                                 
 16. Shepherd & England, supra note 14, at 1919. 
 17. The phrase “parens patriae” literally means parent of the country or nation and refers to the role of 
the state as guardian of persons under disability, including minor children.  Julia Halloran McLaughlin, 
The Fundamental Truth About Best Interests, 54 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 113, 120 (2009).    
 18. An Assessment of Access to Counsel and Quality of Representation in Juvenile Offender Matters, 
ABA JUV. JUST. CTR. (2003) 6 [hereinafter ABA Assessment]; Anthony Platt & Ruth Friedman, The 
Limits of Advocacy: Occupational Hazards in Juvenile Court, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1156, 1159 (1968). 
 19. Platt & Friedman, supra note 18, at 1176. 
 20. Ventrell, supra note 5, at 260–61.  
 21. Id. at 262. 
 22. The paternalistic notion that the court knows what is best for the child regardless of the child’s 
point of view stemmed from the antiquated concept that children were property of their parents.  From the 
1800s until the mid-1900s, parental control over children was absolute.  The state did not question 
parental authority over children nor intervene into family life.  Likewise, the state did not provide services 
to assist parents and did not provide protection to children against abuse or neglect by parents.  In the 
twentieth century, child abuse became the subject of academic discourse and recognized as a significant 
problem in society.  States began to pass child protection laws which provided for state intervention into 
the family.  States also set up juvenile courts to adjudicate minors for the commission of criminal offenses.  
The original juvenile courts handled both delinquency and dependency cases and operated within the 
parens patriae paradigm.  Ventrell, supra note 5, at 260–61, 267. 
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The development of the juvenile court system into a rights-based system 
began with the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in In re Gault.23  There, the 
Court held that juveniles in delinquency proceedings have due process rights, 
the most important of which is the right to counsel.24  When procedural and 
substantive due process rights are at issue, lawyers must advocate to protect 
such rights.  Protection of due process rights can only be effectuated by legal 
advocacy, not by paternalism.25  
However, the paternalistic origins of the juvenile court system persist as 
a hallmark of the modern juvenile justice system, undermining the 
progression of the child’s right to counsel and the function of the child’s 
representative.26  Judges and lawyers continue to view their roles as 
“protectors of the helpless” and consequently, do not necessarily consider the 
judgment of the child reliable.  Therefore, judges have not been quick to 
embrace a traditional lawyer-client model of representation for children.  
Adherence to the paternalistic view of representing children has impeded the 
progress of the juvenile court into an effective rights-based system, 
particularly in the area of dependency cases.  In delinquency matters, while 
paternalism continues to be an obstacle to effective legal advocacy, there is at 
least a recognition that the goal should be legal advocacy as opposed to the 
parens patriae approach to representation.27  Thus, lawyers who represent 
children accused of wrongdoing have a clear mandate that they should 
protect their client’s legal rights.  However, lawyers who represent children 
who are subjected to abuse and neglect do not have a clear mandate about the 
goal of representation.  
 
B. The Guiding Principles of Best Interests of the Child and Family 
Preservation in Dependency Proceedings 
 
Under current juvenile law, the legal principles that govern the operation 
of the juvenile dependency court are the best interests of the child and family 
preservation.28  The best interest standard developed after the parens patriae 
doctrine as one way to resolve disputes in which the state brought an action 
against a parent it deemed unfit.29  The best interest of the child is the lens 
through which the juvenile court views the relationship of the rights and 
duties existing between parents, children, and the state.30  For example, the 
court must determine the child’s best interest in any dispositional phase of a 
                                                 
 23. 387 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 24. Id. at 41. 
 25. Henning, supra note 6, at 322; see also DUQUETTE & HARALAMBIE, supra note 2, at 197. 
 26. Henning, supra note 6, at 322. 
 27. Id. 
 28. DUQUETTE & HARALAMBIE, supra note 2, at 140. 
 29. Peters, supra note 6, at 1514. 
 30. McLaughlin, supra note 17, at 119. 
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dependency proceeding, when the court decides whether to return the child to 
the parents or continue custody with the state welfare agency.31  The court 
also considers the best interests of the child as part of the substantive 
standard for a termination of parental rights.32  Typically, in addition to the 
statutory factors required for termination of parental rights, the court must 
determine whether termination would be in the best interests of the child.33  
The best interest standard is a child-centered principle that focuses on the 
safety and well-being of the child.  It directs and guides many court decisions 
about appropriate outcomes for children.34 
Family preservation is another guiding principle for juvenile dependency 
courts and calls for the reunification of families whenever possible.35  The 
family preservation doctrine is grounded in the recognition that families 
should remain together.36  Federal law requires that state child welfare 
agencies engage in “reasonable efforts . . . to preserve and reunify 
families[,]” “to prevent or eliminate the need for removing the child from the 
child's home[,]” and to make it possible for a child to safely return home.37  
In practice, the state agency is required to show reasonable efforts at several 
stages of the dependency proceedings.  Thus, the child welfare system places 
great emphasis on family unity and preservation.38   
The juvenile court judge is charged with making determinations that are 
in the best interests of the child as well as preserve the family unit.  When 
doing so, the judge relies upon information presented by counsel for the 
various parties, which includes the state agency, the parents, and the child.  
The current juvenile court system no longer functions as an informal 
exchange between the judge and the child.  Juvenile court judges function in 
the same manner as all judges and rely on the lawyers for the parties to bring 
forth evidence and make arguments.  In reaching their decisions, juvenile 
court judges depend upon adequate representation of all parties: state 
agencies, parents, and children.39  As the juvenile dependency court has 
                                                 
 31. Peters, supra note 5, at 1514. 
 32. Id.; DUQUETTE & HARALAMBIE, supra note 2, at 360–61. 
 33. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE ANN. § 366.26 (West 2012); D.C. CODE § 16-2353 (2012); 
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.806 (West 2012); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-94 (West 2012); MONT. CODE ANN. § 
41-3-609 (2012). 
 34. DUQUETTE & HARALAMBIE, supra note 2, at 194. 
 35. Id. at 195. 
 36. Id. 
 37. 42 U.S.C. § 671 (2010).  Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 671, states are eligible for federal funding as long 
as the state foster care agency makes reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify families. Id.  
 38. Andrew Hoffman, The Role of Child’s Counsel in State Intervention Proceedings: Toward A 
Rebuttable Presumption in Favor of Family Reunification, 3 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 326, 331 (2004). 
 39. The child's status as a "party" in a dependency case is currently a matter of some debate based upon 
differences in state law. See FIRST STAR & CHILDREN’S ADVOCACY INSTITUTE, A CHILD’S RIGHT TO 
COUNSEL: A NATIONAL REPORT CARD ON LEGAL REPRESENTATION FOR ABUSED & NEGLECTED 
CHILDREN 23-131 (3d ed. 2012), available at http://www.firststar.org/library/report-cards.aspx 
[hereinafter FIRST STAR REPORT] (finding that thirty-four states give children full party status in 
dependency proceedings).  However, the premise that the child is a party to the dependency matter is 
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developed into a rights-based system, there is an increased recognition that 
the litigants require legal counsel to ensure adequate protection of their 
rights.40 
 
III.  DEVELOPMENT OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
  
The Supreme Court’s landmark decision in In re Gault in 1967 began the 
path toward recognition of children’s rights.  The Court established due 
process rights for children in delinquency proceedings, including the right to 
counsel.41  A few years later, the passage of CAPTA recognized that children 
in dependency proceedings also deserved representation.  CAPTA, however, 
brought only the requirement of a guardian ad litem, not necessarily legal 
counsel, to children involved in those cases.  Thus, while children in 
delinquency proceedings have a constitutionally recognized right to legal 
counsel and the corresponding right to effective advocacy, children in 
dependency proceedings do not.42 
When Congress enacted CAPTA in 1974, states began enacting 
legislation providing for the appointment of representatives for children in 
dependency cases.  CAPTA provides funding to states to assist with the 
improvement of their child protective systems.43  One condition of the receipt 
of federal funding is the requirement for the appointment of a representative 
for the child at all stages of legal proceedings.44  The CAPTA representative 
must be a guardian ad litem who is to obtain a clear understanding of the 
situation and needs of the child and to make recommendations to the court 
concerning the best interests of the child.45  CAPTA permits the child’s 
guardian ad litem to be an attorney but does not require this.46  Thus, largely 
driven by federal mandate, state laws regarding representation in child 
dependency cases have developed within the guardian ad litem/best interest 
paradigm.47 
The CAPTA representative is unlike the child’s counsel in delinquency 
cases.  Delinquency matters, pursuant to In re Gault, require the appointment 
                                                                                                                   
adopted for purposes of this article. 
 40. DUQUETTE & HARALAMBIE, supra note 2, at 197. 
 41. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 41.  
 42. Although scholars continue to debate the effectiveness and adequacy of counsel for children in 
delinquency proceedings, such issues are not addressed in this article.  For purposes of this discussion, it is 
important to note that children in delinquency proceedings have a constitutional right to counsel via the 
Supreme Court’s decision in In re Gault, whereas children in dependency proceedings do not have a 
legally recognized constitutional right to counsel.  Courts have alluded to the right, but the U.S. Supreme 
Court has not held that children have a right to counsel in protective proceedings and no federal statute 
provides for such right.  Sobie, supra note 5, at 757.   
 43. 42 U.S.C. § 5106a (2010). 
 44. Id.  
 45. Id. 
 46. Id.  
 47. Sobie, supra note 5, at 789. 
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of independent legal counsel.  Dependency cases have no such corresponding 
federal or constitutional mandate.48  Thus, representatives for the child in 
dependency proceedings do not operate within a clearly defined model of 
representation.  In fact, the role of the child’s representative in a dependency 
case, in large part due to the CAPTA requirement, is unclear and 
inconsistent.  CAPTA specifically requires a guardian ad litem, or other 
individual whom the State recognizes as fulfilling the same functions as a 
guardian ad litem, who makes a recommendation to the court about the best 
interests of the child.49  CAPTA states that the representative may be an 
attorney or a court appointed special advocate who has received training 
appropriate to that role, or both.50  In order to comply with the mandates of 
CAPTA, states have enacted laws appointing a representative for the child in 
dependency proceedings.  Some states require the appointment of guardians 
ad litem, some require attorneys, and some require attorneys who function as 
guardians ad litem.51  The result is a lack of uniformity regarding the role of 
the representative for children in dependency cases across the nation. 
 
A.  The Child’s Right to Counsel in Delinquency Matters 
   
  As explained earlier, delinquency cases involve juveniles who are 
alleged to have committed a crime or violation of the law.  Under current 
practices, the process is similar to that for adults accused of committing 
crimes: arrest, probable cause finding, detention or release, trial and 
sentencing.  The juvenile system differs from the adult system in the lack of a 
right to jury trials52 and in the purpose of sentencing.53  During the 
punishment phase of the proceedings, juvenile courts are concerned with the 
rehabilitation of the child and are governed by the best interest of the child 
standard.  In keeping with the notion of rehabilitation, sentencing ranges are 
limited by law in juvenile courts.  In addition, many more options for 
diverting children away from incarceration or restriction of liberty are 
available in juvenile courts than in adult courts.  The courts look for 
programs designed to assist the child in modifying his or her behavior.54  
Regardless of the range of dispositions available in juvenile delinquency 
proceedings, courts have determined that the child’s liberty is at stake and 
therefore, have established a right to counsel to protect that interest.   
                                                 
 48. Id. at 757. 
 49. 45 C.F.R. § 1340.14 (1990). 
 50. 42 U.S.C. § 5106a (2010). 
 51. See First Star Report, supra note 39. 
 52. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971) (denying juveniles the right to jury trials in 
state delinquency proceedings). 
 53. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION JUVENILE JUSTICE CENTER ET AL., A CALL FOR JUSTICE: AN 
ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY 
PROCEEDINGS 36 (2002). 
 54. Id. at 37. 
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The establishment of due process rights for juveniles in delinquency 
proceedings began with the In re Gault decision.  The Court held that 
because juvenile delinquency proceedings could result in commitment or 
confinement in a state institution, such proceedings must measure up to the 
essentials of due process and fair treatment.55  The due process guarantees 
afforded to juveniles in delinquency proceedings by the In re Gault Court 
included the right to counsel.56  
In In re Gault, the Court reviewed the history of the juvenile justice 
system and the traditional rationales for denying procedural safeguards to 
juveniles.57  In rejecting these rationales, the Court observed that “unbridled 
discretion, however benevolently motivated, is frequently a poor substitute 
for principle and procedure” and concluded that the denial of procedural 
rights frequently resulted in arbitrariness rather than “careful, compassionate, 
individualized treatment.”58 
Since the In re Gault decision, juveniles in delinquency proceedings 
have been afforded procedural due process rights similar to those of adults 
accused of crimes.  Juveniles have the right to notice of charges, the right to 
counsel, the right to confront and cross-examine witness, the right to a fair 
and impartial hearing and the right against self-incrimination, among other 
rights.59  Juvenile courts around the nation appoint counsel for children 
accused of committing delinquent acts and conduct proceedings with a 
degree of formality similar to proceedings for adults accused of crimes.60 
After the In re Gault decision, scholars debated the roles, duties and 
loyalties of counsel for children in delinquency proceedings.61  Confusion 
existed about whether child’s counsel should assume a client-directed 
adversary role or a best-interest role at the various stages of delinquency 
proceedings.62  Ultimately, a consensus evolved among scholars and 
practitioners that endorsed a client-directed adversarial model where the 
child’s attorney advocates for the child’s expressed positions.63   
The debate over the proper role of counsel for children in delinquency 
has mirrored the debate ensuing in the dependency arena.  Paternalism 
continues to influence the view that lawyers who represent children should 
represent the children’s best interests because children are either incapable of 
                                                 
 55. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 41. 
 56. Id.  
 57. Barry C. Feld, Violent Youth and Public Policy: A Case Study of Juvenile Justice Law Reform, 79 
MINN. L. REV. 965, 971–72 (1995). 
 58. 387 U.S. at 18. 
 59. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 530 (1975) (double jeopardy); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 
(1970) (applying a beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof). 
 60. Wallace J. Mlyniec, In re Gault at 40: The Right to Counsel in Juvenile Court – A Promise 
Unfulfilled, 44 No. 3 Crim. Law Bulletin ART 5, 2 (2008). 
 61. Henning, supra note 6, at 250. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 255. 
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directing their lawyer or exercise poor judgment.64  In delinquency cases, 
however, the move away from paternalism is based in part upon the view of 
the juvenile justice bar that state intervention is unnecessary and detrimental 
in the lives of children who are accused of wrongdoing.65   Children in 
delinquency proceedings are seen as perpetrators and offenders.  Juvenile 
justice lawyers view their role as defense attorneys who advocate against 
punitive state intervention.66  Such a view allows the attorney to advocate for 
the least intrusive state intervention.67   
The juvenile delinquency system has also, with the In re Gault decision, 
evolved into a rights-based system.68  When children have due process rights, 
adequate and effective representation necessarily requires advocacy as 
opposed to a paternalistic approach to representation.69 
Currently, case law and standards of practice support the traditional, 
client-directed, adversary model of advocacy in delinquency cases and direct 
attorneys for children in such matters  to represent the legal interests of their 
child clients.70  These legal interests include all the due process rights that 
have been afforded to children following the In re Gault decision.71  Because 
delinquency proceedings are similar to adult criminal proceedings, the 
juvenile justice system shares the view that state intervention into the life of 
the accused is intrusive, and should be limited.72  Lawyers for children in 
delinquency proceedings understand their role to be that of an advocate 
against state intervention, and an advocate for the protection of due process 
rights.73  In addition, lawyers for delinquent youth follow the directives of 
their child clients regarding the goals they hope to achieve with 
representation.74  The juvenile delinquency court has thus evolved into a 
rights-based system that relies on effective advocacy by the lawyers who 
represent the parties to the litigation.75 
However, the Court in In re Gault did not extend due process protections 
                                                 
 64. See Federle, supra note 6, at 108. 
 65. See Appell, supra note 7, at 588–91. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id.; Sobie, supra note 5, at 764. 
 68. Henning, supra note 6, at 289.  
 69. Federle, supra note 6, at 110; Henning, supra note 6, at 288–92; Elrod, supra note 5, at 891–94.  
 70. Henning, supra note 6, at 255–58; Shepherd & England, supra note 14, at 1941–42; ABA 
Assessment, supra note 18, at 29; JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS: STANDARDS RELATING TO COUNSEL 
FOR PRIVATE PARTIES, § 3.1 (1980); NAT’L JUVENILE DEFENDER CTR., ROLE OF DEFENSE COUNSEL IN 
DELINQUENCY COURT (2009).  Although the effectiveness of counsel for children in delinquency 
proceedings remains a subject of debate, the role of counsel in delinquency proceedings is that of a 
traditional attorney, who advocates for the client’s positions, and protects the client’s legal interests.  This 
role of counsel for children, at least in theory, is entrenched in delinquency proceedings in the juvenile 
court system. 
 71. Henning, supra note 6, at 289; Sobie, supra note 5, at 764. 
 72. Shepherd & England, supra note 14, at 1941–42.  
 73. Sobie, supra note 5, at 764.  
 74. ABA Assessment, supra note 18, at 29.  
 75. DUQUETTE & HARALAMBIE, supra note 2, at 197.  
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to juveniles in dependency proceedings.76  The underlying matter in In re 
Gault was a delinquency case, and the Court limited its decision to such 
cases.  Other situations involving juveniles and the state, such as when 
children are alleged to be abused or neglected, were not at issue.77  Thus, the 
right to counsel and the corresponding directives for the traditional attorney 
role have not been extended to children who are alleged to be abused or 
neglected.   
 
B.  The Child’s Right to Counsel in Dependency Matters  
 
Matters involving juveniles who are mistreated are typically known as 
dependency cases.78  Mistreatment includes physical abuse, sexual abuse, 
emotional abuse, and neglect.79   
Dependency proceedings are generally civil in nature, though the legal 
consequences can be quite severe if the case progresses to termination of 
parental rights.  The case is initiated by a state child welfare agency.80  The 
state agency initially makes the decision whether to remove the child from 
the home.81  The agency then files a complaint, or petition, with the juvenile 
court.82  The agency must prove the allegations of abuse or neglect, and 
provide a basis for the removal of the child from the home.83  The state is the 
petitioner, the parents are the respondents, and the child’s welfare is the 
subject of the proceeding.84  Dependency cases often include several 
participants, including the child, the state agency, the parents, foster parents, 
or other caretakers.85  The purpose of the proceeding is to determine, first, if 
the child is abused or neglected, and, if so, what action should be taken and 
where the child should be placed.86  
A dependency proceeding begins with the report of abuse or neglect to a 
state agency, which files a complaint with the juvenile court.87  The first 
court proceeding is a preliminary hearing where decisions are made about the 
initial custody of the child, in consideration of the child’s safety.88  
Subsequently, the adjudicatory hearing occurs, and the court determines 
whether the child is an abused or neglected child.89  If the child is found to be 
                                                 
 76. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 13.  
 77. Id. 
 78. DUQUETTE & HARALAMBIE, supra note 2, at 168. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 343–61.  
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. DUQUETTE & HARALAMBIE, supra note 2, 343–61. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id.  
 89. Id. 
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abused or neglected, the court then determines disposition of the child.90  A 
disposition concerns custody, the state agency’s plan for the child and family, 
and the needs of the child and family.91  Following the disposition, review 
hearings are held periodically while the child is in state custody.92  Parents 
must complete their case plan requirements in order to obtain the return of 
their child.93  If parents do not complete their case plan, an alternative 
placement must be found.94  Ultimately, if parents do not complete their case 
plan, or the child continues to face abuse or neglect, a case could result in the 
termination of parental rights.  Following termination, a child will either be 
adopted, or remain in long-term foster care.95 
Because the Supreme Court in In re Gault did not extend due process 
rights to juveniles in dependency proceedings, the corresponding right to 
counsel did not extend to juveniles in such proceedings.96  The Court in In re 
Gault held that due process protections are triggered because juvenile 
delinquency proceedings can lead to confinement in a state institution.97    
The Court specifically limited its holding to delinquency matters.98  Although 
the U.S. Supreme Court has not specifically addressed whether there should 
be a right to counsel in dependency cases, courts across the country have 
found a similar due process right in such cases.99   
For example, in Kenny A. ex rel. Winn v. Perdue,100 the United States 
District Court for the Northern District of Georgia found a constitutional 
right to counsel in dependency cases under the Due Process Clause of the 
Georgia Constitution.101  Similar to the In re Gault decision, the Georgia 
federal court found that children in dependency proceedings have 
fundamental liberty interests at stake.102  Such interests, according to the 
Kenny A. court, include the child’s interest in his or her safety, health, well-
being, and maintenance of the family unit.103  In addition, the court found 
liberty interests at stake in dependency proceedings because children in 
foster care are in state custody and subject to placement in a variety of foster 
care placements including institutional facilities.104   
                                                 
 90. DUQUETTE & HARALAMBIE, supra note 2, 343–61. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id.  
 96. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 27.  
 97. Id. at 27–29.  
 98. Id. at 13–14 (limiting its holding to the determination of delinquency as a result of alleged 
misconduct on the part of the child, and declining to consider the impact of due process upon the “totality 
of the relationship of the juvenile and the state”).   
 99. Shepherd & England, supra note 14, at 1920–23.  
 100. 356 F. Supp. 2d 1353 (N.D. Ga. 2005).  
 101. Id. at 1359–60. 
 102. Id. at 1360. 
 103. Id.  
 104. Id.  
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State courts have similarly found that children in dependency 
proceedings have a constitutional due process right to counsel.105 
Despite the trend toward recognition of a due process right to counsel for 
children in dependency proceedings, the parens patriae approach has 
remained the central component of the juvenile court system in regards to 
such cases.106  The juvenile court acts in the role of guardian or parent for 
purposes of determining appropriate outcomes and placements for mistreated 
children.107  The juvenile court typically relies on a guardian ad litem, or an 
attorney who plays the role of a guardian ad litem, to assist in the decision 
making process.108  The guardian ad litem, or attorney guardian ad litem, 
makes a recommendation to the court about the best interests of the child and 
the court relies on such recommendations to reach its decisions.109   
Children in dependency proceedings, unlike children in delinquency 
proceedings, are seen as helpless victims who are in need of protection 
against wrongdoers.110  Lawyers who represent abused and neglected 
children see their role as protective or prosecutorial, and therefore, 
paternalistic.111  Child welfare lawyers are more likely to welcome state 
intervention as necessary to protect their clients, and thus succumb to the 
parens patriae paradigm.112  By doing so, lawyers in dependency 
proceedings perpetuate the best-interest model of lawyering as opposed to 
the traditional advocate model.  
The passage of CAPTA in 1974 by Congress imposed the requirement 
that all children in abuse and neglect proceedings be represented.113    
However, CAPTA does not require that children be represented by 
counsel.114  CAPTA requires only that a guardian ad litem be appointed to 
represent the child and permits the guardian ad litem to be a lay advocate, or 
an attorney, or both.115  Thus, CAPTA does not guarantee the child’s right to 
counsel in abuse and neglect proceedings, and states do not consistently 
provide counsel for children in such proceedings. 
With the lack of a constitutional mandate for counsel for children,  
                                                 
 105. See, e.g., In re Dependency of M.S.R. and T.S.R., 174 Wash. 2d 1, 20 (2012) (children have 
fundamental liberty interests at stake in termination of parental rights proceedings and at least the same 
due process rights to counsel as do indigent parents subject to dependency proceedings); In re Jamie T.T., 
191 A.D. 2d 132, 135–37 (1993) (finding that child has a constitutional due process right to effective legal 
counsel in abuse proceedings). 
 106. DUQUETTE & HARALAMBIE, supra note 2, at 190–95. 
 107. Id. at 188–94.   
 108. See, e.g., Atwood I, supra note 7, at 400; Marcia M. Boumil, Cristina F. Freitas & Debbie F. 
Freitas, Legal and Ethical Issues Confronting Guardian ad Litem Practice, 13 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 43, 46, 
66 (2011).  
 109. Id.  
 110. Appell, supra note 7, at 591. 
 111. Id. at 588–89. 
 112. Id. at 613. 
 113. 45 C.F.R. § 1340.14 (1990). 
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prevalence of the parens patriae model, and CAPTA’s requirement for a 
guardian ad litem, the right of children in dependency proceedings to legal 
counsel has not developed along the same path as that of children in 
delinquency proceedings.  Nevertheless, scholars overwhelmingly take the 
position that children in dependency proceedings are entitled to legal 
representation.116  The majority of states also follows this trend and appoints 
counsel for children in dependency proceedings.117  The difference among 
states is the type of representation afforded to children.  
A few states continue to provide representation for the child in 
dependency proceedings in the form of a lay guardian ad litem.118  The 
guardian ad litem is generally an officer of the court and is appointed to 
protect the child’s interest without being bound by the child’s expressed 
preferences.119  
Other states provide representation for the child in dependency 
proceedings in the form of an attorney.120  The child’s attorney is expected to 
represent the child’s expressed positions, and perform the functions of 
traditional legal counsel.121 
Most states provide for a hybrid model of representation where the child 
is represented by an attorney who functions as a guardian ad litem.122  The 
attorney ad litem is expected to act as an attorney and give voice to the 
child’s positions while also determining and advocating for the child’s best 
interests.123  Therein lies the problem; when lawyers are instructed to act as 
guardians ad litem, role confusion and ineffective lawyering occur.124  
 
IV.  ROLE OF COUNSEL 
 
As explained above, the role, responsibilities, and loyalties of counsel for 
children have been the subject of intense debate for nearly fifty years.125  
Two schools of thought have emerged about the model of legal 
representation: the client-directed or expressed wishes approach mirrors the 
                                                 
 116. See Erik Pitchal, Children’s Constitutional Right to Counsel in Dependency Cases, 15 TEMP. POL. 
& CIV. RTS. L. REV. 663 (2006); Elrod, supra note 5; Ventrell, supra note 5; Randi Mandelbaum, 
Revisiting the Question of Whether Young Children in Child Protection Proceedings Should be 
Represented by Lawyers, 32 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1 (2000);  Jacob Ethan Smiles, A Child’s Due Process 
Right to Legal Counsel in Abuse and Neglect Dependency Proceedings, 37 FAM. L.Q. 485 (2003).   
 117. See FIRST STAR REPORT, supra note 39. 
 118. Id. 
 119. STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR LAWYERS WHO REPRESENT CHILDREN IN ABUSE AND NEGLECT 
CASES § A-2 (1996), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/child/PublicDocuments/repstandwhole.authcheckd
am.pdf [hereinafter ABA STANDARDS]. 
 120. See FIRST STAR REPORT, supra note 51. 
 121. Id.; Boumil, Freitas & Freitas, supra note 108, at 48–49.   
 122. See FIRST STAR REPORT, supra note 51. 
 123. FIRST STAR REPORT, supra note 51; Boumil, Freitas & Freitas, supra note 108, at 48–49.   
 124. Bernabe, supra note 6, 833–36. 
 125. Sobie, supra note 5, at 787. 
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role of the traditional attorney; the best-interest approach mirrors the 
guardian ad litem role.126 
The “client-directed” model of representation is a traditional attorney 
role where the same requirements of adult representation apply to children.127  
Under this model, lawyers owe the same basic duties to child clients as to 
adult clients.128  Such duties include communication, investigation, and 
confidentiality.129  The traditional attorney role requires lawyers to represent 
children as individuals, protect the legal rights of the child clients, give the 
child clients voice in the legal proceedings, and advocate for the counseled 
positions of the child client.130 
The “best-interest” model of representation is a substituted judgment 
model.131  The attorney or representative for the child substitutes his or her 
opinion of what would be best for the child and advocates for that position.132  
This approach encompasses the role of the traditional guardian ad litem. 
Attorneys representing children in delinquency matters have a clear 
directive to advocate for the counseled positions of their clients, and to 
maintain the traditional attorney role.133  In the years following the Supreme 
Court’s landmark decision in In re Gault, scholars debated the roles, 
responsibilities, and loyalties of the child’s lawyer in delinquency cases.134  
The confusion emerged from the tension between the paternalistic, best-
interest form of representation and the adversarial, client-directed role of 
counsel as used in adult criminal cases.135  Commentators also debated 
whether the role of counsel should differ from the adjudication phase, where 
the determination of delinquency is made, and the dispositional phase where 
the focus is rehabilitation of the child rather than punishment of the child.136  
By the early 1980s, a consensus evolved among scholars and professionals 
that the appropriate model of representation in juvenile delinquency matters 
is the client-directed, adversarial model.137  
Attorneys representing children in dependency matters, however, do not 
have clear direction about their roles, responsibilities, and loyalties.138  
Scholars continually debate the effectiveness of the best-interest and client-
                                                 
 126. Id. 
 127. Ventrell, supra note 5, at 268. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 274–76. 
 130. See Appell, supra note 7, at 589; Bernabe, supra note 6, at 857; Guggenheim I, supra note 5, at 79–
80. 
 131. See Elrod, supra note 5, at 910–11. 
 132. Bernabe, supra note 6, at 857; Edwards & Sagatun, supra note 10, at 72–74. 
 133. Henning, supra note 6, at 255–56; ABA Assessment, supra note 18, at 29. 
 134. Henning, supra note 6, at 250. 
 135. Bernabe, supra note 6, at 853–58; Henning, supra note 6, at 250; Shepherd & England, supra note 
14, at 1933–34. 
 136. Henning, supra note 6, at 251. 
 137. Id. at 255. 
 138. Sobie, supra note 5, at 746. 
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directed models.139  The two models of representation continue to confuse 
and cloud the proper role of lawyers for children in dependency 
proceedings.140 
 




In child dependency proceedings, although state laws vary, children are 
more often appointed attorneys who function as guardians ad litem rather 
than as client-directed lawyers.141  The preference for the guardian ad litem 
or best-interest model of representation is based in large part upon CAPTA’s 
requirement that states appoint guardians for children in abuse and neglect 
proceedings.142  The best-interest model of lawyering emerged also from the 
juvenile court’s paternalistic treatment of children and fits within the parens 
patriae paradigm.143  
Traditionally in juvenile court, the judge acts as parens patriae and 
makes the decision regarding what is best for the child.144  In making their 
decisions, judges rely on the information provided by the litigants.  In 
dependency proceedings, while the state agency and the parents are 
represented by counsel, courts appoint guardians ad litem to protect the 
interests of the children.145  Courts rely on guardians ad litem to gather 
information, conduct factual investigation, and make recommendations in 
written or oral form to the court.146  Such reports detail information gathered 
as well as the guardian’s own observations and include recommendations for 
appropriate disposition regarding the child.147  The guardian ad litem 
determines what outcome would be in the best interests of the child.  The 
guardian ad litem is expected to articulate and present a finding about the 
best interests of the child, regardless of the child’s expressed positions.148  
Courts view guardians ad litem as officers of the court or as extensions of the 
                                                 
 139. See supra note 7 (providing examples of scholars who have extensively debated the role of child 
lawyers in juvenile court over the past 45 years). 
 140. See Marrus, supra note 14, at 326; Shepherd & England, supra note 14, at 1933–34. 
 141. Barbara A. Atwood, The Uniform Representation of Children in Abuse, Neglect, and Custody 
Proceedings Act: Bridging the Divide between Pragmatism and Idealism, 42 FAM. L.Q. 63, 74 (2008) 
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 144. Elrod, supra note 5, at 894. 
 145. Boumil, Freitas & Freitas, supra note 108, at 43. 
 146. Id. at 46. 
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 148. Id. at 45; see also Nancy J. Moore, Conflicts of Interests in the Representation of Children, 64 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1819, 1823 (1996) (while guardians ad litem do consider to a child’s expressed 
positions, this is only one component in evaluating the child’s best interests and the guardian ad litem is 
not ultimately bound to advocate for those positions). 
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court.149  The guardian ad litem’s duty of loyalty is not to the child client, but 
to the court.150  Judges tend to rely on the recommendations of the guardian 
ad litem in making their own decisions because the guardian ad litem is 
directed to represent the best interests of the child and not act as an 
advocate.151 
The enactment of CAPTA brought only the requirement of a guardian ad 
litem or a representative who acts in the guardian ad litem role.152  CAPTA 
does not require that an attorney be appointed for children in dependency 
proceedings, only that a guardian ad litem or other guardian ad litem-like 
representative be appointed.  Since the enactment of CAPTA, the majority of 
states do not require the appointment of attorneys who act in the traditional 
client-directed role for children in dependency proceedings.153  The majority 
of states require the appointment of attorneys who act as guardians ad litem 
and advocate for the best interests of the child client regardless of the child 
client’s positions.154  This hybrid role in dependency proceedings reflects the 
adherence to the paternalistic notion that lawyers for children should 
advocate for what they believe to be in the best interests of the child.155 
The best-interest lawyer must generally substitute his or her own 
judgment about what outcome would be best for the child rather than receive 
direction from the child as to what the child desires the outcome to be.156  
The best-interest lawyer may consider various criteria such as protection and 
emotional needs of the child.157  But the best-interest lawyer necessarily 
relies on his or her subjective views in deciding the course of action that 
serves the best interests of the child.158  Essentially, the lawyer has complete 
discretion to arrive at a decision about the best interests of the child using 
whatever process the lawyer chooses with no procedural or substantive 
guidelines.159  This best-interest approach does not necessarily follow the 
                                                 
 149. Jennifer L. Anton, The Ambiguous Role and Responsibilities of a Guardian ad Litem in Texas in 
Personal Injury Litigation, 51 SMU L. REV. 161, 171 (1997). 
 150. See Boumil, Freitas & Freitas, supra note 108, at 45–46 (courts rely on guardians ad litem to gather 
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 155. Appell, supra note 7, at 580. 
 156. See Elrod, supra note 5, at 911. 
 157. Sobie, supra note 5, at 791. 
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guidelines set forth by the bar for the ethical conduct of lawyers.160  The best-
interest lawyer functions as a guardian ad litem and does not adhere to the 
fundamental requirement that lawyers advocate for the legal interests of their 
clients and follow the directives of their clients in regards to the objectives of 
litigation.161 
This model has appeal to legislatures due to the perception that children 
are incapable of directing their attorneys.162  Historically, courts, not the 
legislatures, have begun to recognize children as rights-bearing citizens.163  
Legislators continue to view children as helpless and in need of paternal 
representation.   
This model also appeals to the judiciary because the recommendation of 
a guardian ad litem provides an identifiable basis for the judge’s decision in a 
case.  The judge’s job of determining the best interests of the child is 
certainly easier when a guardian ad litem provides a recommendation as an 
arm of the court.164  Although case law is somewhat inconsistent on the issue 
of the proper role of counsel, courts have routinely held that lawyers 
representing children in dependency proceedings must advocate for the best 




The best-interest model of lawyering has several flaws.  One main flaw 
is that the best-interest lawyer has “unfettered discretion” to substitute her 
own judgment to determine the goals of the litigation.166  When attorneys 
substitute their own judgment, they will necessarily insert their own personal 
views and values thereby displacing the values of children and their 
parents.167  As decision-maker, the best-interest lawyer faces the dilemma of 
choosing among competing values, such as religion, education, culture, race, 
and the emotional well-being of the child.  Which value takes precedence in 
a child’s life should depend upon the personal views of the child and his 
parents, not upon the attorney for the child.168  Lawyers may refer to their 
own childhoods, stereotypical views of clients with backgrounds that differ 
from their own, and their lay knowledge and opinions about child 
                                                 
 160. See Boumil, Freitas & Freitas, supra note 108, at 51–53; Taylor, supra note 11, at 618. 
 161. See Boumil, Freitas & Freitas, supra note 108, at 51; Taylor, supra note 11, at 618. 
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development and children’s needs.169  Thus, the best-interest model 
inappropriately substitutes the values and judgment of a lawyer for the child 
“so that the ‘wrong person’ ends up deciding the goals and objectives of the 
advocacy.”170 
In a dependency proceeding, the best interests of the child are often times 
contested issues and thus, it is not always clear whose interests the child 
attorney serves.171  If the attorney is not required to advocate for the child’s 
positions, the attorney’s role is then reduced to agreement with one of the 
parties and the child remains voiceless.   
The power of an attorney in the attorney-client relationship is magnified 
when the client is a child.172  The tendency toward paternalism is amplified 
when the lawyer is instructed to use her own judgment in representing the 
child, rather than objective legal criteria.173  The best-interest attorney thus 
yields extraordinary power over the direction of the litigation, yet holds little 
accountability for her decisions.174  The best-interest lawyer has unchecked 
power because he is told to proceed based upon his own personal opinions 
rather than giving a voice to the child’s positions or advocating for legal 
rights.175 
Lawyers are not qualified, trained, or otherwise prepared to fulfill the 
role of a guardian ad litem who determines the best interests of the child.176  
Neither law school curricula nor the practice of law provide guidance on 
child development, child welfare, or family dynamics.177  Lawyers are ill-
equipped to navigate the cross-cultural, socio-economic issues that affect 
families.178  In addition, lawyers are generally vastly different, particularly in 
terms of class, race, and educational backgrounds, from the children they 
represent.179  The lack of familiarity with the child’s background and family 
values that may be important to the child, coupled with the lack of training, 
can significantly lessen a lawyer’s ability to assess a child’s needs and 
represent the child’s best interests.    
Best-interest lawyers confront ethical uncertainty about the attorney-
client privilege, scope of representation, and use of evidence, among other 
issues.180  For example, the attorney-client privilege is often lost when the 
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attorney is instructed to take on the role of guardian ad litem.181  Guardians 
ad litem do not have a duty of confidentiality to their wards.182  When 
attorneys engage in best-interest advocacy, as opposed to traditional client-
directed advocacy, they necessarily put themselves in the same position as a 
guardian ad litem.  Courts have found that best-interest attorneys do not have 
the duty of confidentiality as do traditional lawyers.183   
The primary drawback to the best-interest model is that the child’s voice 
is lost.184  To be meaningful, legal representation should allow the client to be 
heard in the proceedings.  When the attorney acts as a guardian, in lieu of a 
traditional attorney, the client’s voice is not expressed and thus not heard.185 
Scholars generally agree that the best-interest model does not suffice in 
dependency proceedings.186  It is too broad and indeterminate to be an 
effective model for lawyers for children.187  If children have a right to 
counsel in dependency proceedings, that counsel should also help their 
voices be heard. 
 




The role of an attorney in the traditional sense is to advocate for the 
counseled positions of the client and to protect the client’s legal interests.  In 
most areas of legal practice, there is no other option.  Lawyers are mandated 
by the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (“MRPC”) to represent their 
clients’ legitimate interests as determined by the client.188  However, in child 
dependency cases, the traditional attorney role has become a separate track 
from the best-interest model and is an option, rather than a mandate, for the 
representation of children. 
The MRPC are the governing rules for the client-directed attorney 
model.189  Pursuant to MRPC 1.2, the child client directs the litigation and 
the attorney must abide by the child’s positions regarding his or her 
preference for the outcome of the case.190   
Scholarly opinions, as well as standards for practitioners, support this 
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model of representation in the child dependency area.191  Almost two decades 
ago, Professors Ramsey and Guggenheim proposed that lawyers should 
represent the positions of their child clients in the traditional attorney role.192 
Since then, scholars have generally favored the client-directed traditional 
attorney model for children in dependency proceedings.193 
The client-directed model also has overwhelming support in professional 
standards and policies.194  The American Bar Association (“ABA”) standards 
and the National Association of Counsel for Children (“NACC”) guidelines 
endorse the client-directed model for children in dependency cases.195  
Additionally, conferences held at Fordham University and the University of 
Nevada Las Vegas (“UNLV”) published recommendations for client-directed 
lawyers for children.196   
Despite support by the profession and scholars, the traditional model 




The primary concern with the traditional attorney model of representing 
children occurs because some children are too young or immature to make 
informed decisions about their own well-being.197  When a child cannot 
articulate his or her own desires, the advocate cannot know what the child’s 
interests are and there is no certainty that the advocate is responsive to the 
child’s interests.198  The likely result will be a return to the attorney’s own 
views of what would be in the best interest of the child, rather than advocacy 
for the counseled positions of the child.   
Equally troubling for lawyers representing children is the dilemma that 
occurs when the child’s positions seemingly conflict with his or her best 
interests.  Children often want to return to their parents even when the 
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parents are abusive, neglectful, or otherwise expose the child to harm.199  In 
such a scenario, the natural tendency of lawyers is to protect the child and 
take on the parens patriae-based guardian ad litem role.  The lawyer would 
then revert to advocating for what he believes to be in the best interest of the 
child rather than what the child desires or prefers.  Alternatively, the lawyer 
would be in the position of advocating for a result that may be harmful to the 
child client. 
Scholars have responded to the issue in various ways.  One proposes that 
very young children need have no legal representation at all.200  Another 
proposal is for the lawyer to take no position or to limit advocacy to “legal 
interests.”201  However, the lawyer then faces the issue of defining the legal 
interests.202  Still, another proposed solution is to appoint a best-interest 
lawyer for the young, pre-verbal child.203  The question then becomes at what 
age are children unable to assist counsel?  Some scholars put the age at 
seven.204  But some children are able to express an opinion about their 
circumstances as young as age five.205  Even some four-year-old children are 
able to express an opinion regarding where they prefer to live and with 
whom.206 
While scholars and the bar support the traditional client-directed lawyer 
model for children in dependency proceedings, the dilemma of the pre-verbal 
child or the child whose position may lead to harm continues to pervade the 
discussion.  The answer to the dilemma inevitably leads back to a version of 
the best-interest, paternalistic model of representation.  The answer remains 
ambiguous and overly complicated.  Until the dichotomy between the best-
interest model and client-directed model is eliminated, the goal of effective 
representation for dependent children will remain elusive. 
 
V.  PROPOSAL:  OVERCOMING THE DICHOTOMY 
 
To overcome the dichotomy between client-directed lawyering and best-
interest lawyering, we must accept that the dichotomy is false and 
unnecessary.  There should be no choice between client-directed and best-
interest models of lawyering.  Lawyers should act as lawyers and should 
advocate for their clients’ counseled positions.  At the same time, lawyers 
can, and should, protect their clients’ interests. 
Scholars and practitioners have reached a general consensus that legal 
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representation is needed for children in dependency proceedings because the 
abused and neglected child has a right to counsel.207  In re Gault established 
the right in delinquency proceedings, and courts are finding a similar due 
process right in dependency cases.208  The clear trend in academia and the 
profession is toward the client-directed traditional lawyer model.209  The 
best-interest lawyer model has been criticized heavily by academics.210  In 
addition, the model has been rejected by the Fordham and UNLV 
conferences.211  Nevertheless, state laws continue to require lawyers to take 
on the guardian ad litem role and represent children using a best-interest 
lawyer model.212  Federal law, through CAPTA, continues to require the 
appointment of a guardian ad litem who makes a recommendation to the 
court.213  And judges also generally prefer the best-interest guardian ad litem 
type lawyer because it makes their job easier.214   
The traditional client-directed lawyer is guided by the MRPC.  Support 
for the traditional client-directed model derives from MRPC 1.2 which 
requires lawyers to follow the directives of the client.  On the other hand, the 
best-interest lawyer in a child dependency proceeding is expected to 
advocate for what he or she believes to be in the best interest of the child 
client, regardless of the child’spositions.215  As explained above, this 
approach leads to the interjection of the attorney’s personal opinions.    
Standards promulgated for child attorneys express preference for the 
client-directed role but simultaneously acknowledge and permit the 
traditional lawyer to take on the guardian ad litem role at times.  The ABA 
Standards, for example, limit the advocacy role, but do not eliminate it, and 
accept the attorney ad litem model, albeit reluctantly.216 The ABA Standards 
state that attorneys may accept appointment to represent children under the 
traditional or best-interest model.217  The NACC guidelines similarly allow 
attorneys to act in either capacity.218  Although the NACC is committed to 
client-directed representation, the guidelines limit advocacy for the child’s 
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positions throughout the litigation.219  The NACC guidelines acknowledge 
that a child’s lawyer may exercise a degree of substituted judgment.220  The 
Uniform Representation of Children in Abuse, Neglect, and Custody 
Proceedings Act of 2006 also provides for two distinct lawyer roles, the 
child’s attorney and the best-interest attorney, and specifically endorses the 
best-interest model.221   
The problem for lawyers representing children arises from the conflicting 
directives regarding the role they are required to assume.  The dichotomy 
between the client-directed traditional lawyer model and the best-interest 
guardian lawyer model causes role confusion and leads to ineffective 
lawyering.222  Many scholars recognize that the dichotomy is unnecessary 
and detracts from the debate.223  Some scholars suggest that the dichotomy is 
outmoded and should be abandoned altogether.224  Other scholars find the 
line between the two models to be unclear but recommend moving beyond 
the distinction to establish alternative guidelines for lawyers regardless of 
which model is adopted in the particular jurisdiction.225  However, when state 
laws and courts direct lawyers to represent the best interests of their clients as 
opposed to following the client’s directives, lawyers are necessarily 
enveloped in the tension between the MRPC and the guardian ad litem 
role.226  
Additionally, the use of the term “best interests” in the context of child 
dependency cases is itself confusing and misleading.227  What is in the best 
interests of the child in a dependency case is a decision that lies with, and 
should remain solely with, the juvenile court judge.228  In many aspects of a 
child dependency proceeding, the best interest of the child is the contested 
issue and the ultimate issue to be decided by the judge.229  Each party or 
participant in the proceeding should have the opportunity to voice his or her 
position on the issue.  Parents may argue one avenue is in the best interest of 
the child and the State may argue in favor of another avenue.  The child may 
agree with the parents or with the State or may have a different proposal.  
Each party should be entitled to present evidence and make arguments 
supporting the respective position.  Ultimately, the judge makes the decision 
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and is in the rightful position to make the decision.  Judges are appropriately 
trained and have the responsibility to make such decisions.   
Lawyers are trained to function as lawyers and to protect and advocate 
for the legal rights of their clients.230  Lawyers are not trained to act as arms 
of the court and to make recommendations about what they believe is the 
correct result.231  Lawyers should not be asked or mandated to advocate for 
what they believe to be in the best interests of their clients.232  However, 
lawyers are capable of advocating for their clients’ positions, while also 
protecting the clients’ best interests.233  In practice, a good lawyer always has 
the client’s best interests in mind.234  
The goal of the legal system is to reach the result that is just and 
correct.235  The adversarial system is utilized because it provides the greatest 
likelihood of a correct result in any given case.236  For the adversarial system 
to function appropriately, lawyers must be allowed to operate in the manner 
in which they are trained.237 
 When we abandon the dichotomy between best-interest and client-directed 
lawyering, we can focus on the standards and requirements needed to provide 
the best possible advocates for children.  The bar can revise and add ethical 
standards for lawyers who represent children.238  The bar can also require 
additional training in the form of continuing legal education for lawyers for 
children.  
But when the mandate from the legislature and the courts is for 
children’s lawyers to act like guardians ad litem, the task of promulgating 
standards becomes burdensome and confusing, as it is currently.239  
“[A]dvocacy that is diluted by excessive concern for the client’s best interest 
would raise troubling questions for attorneys in an adversarial system.”240 
Lawyers are required to consider the law, investigate the facts, 
communicate with their clients, and make arguments to the court based upon 
their clients’ objectives, the law, and the facts.  Lawyers who represent 
parties in litigation are not in the appropriate position to act as arms of the 
court or to make the ultimate decision in the form of a recommendation to 
the court.241  Lawyers are trained to advocate and know how to advocate for 
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their clients.242  Lawyers are not trained to know or figure out what is best for 
an abused and neglected child.243 
To overcome the false dichotomy between the client-directed and best 
interest models for attorneys in child welfare cases, the first step is to move 
beyond paternalism and eliminate the language of “best-interest lawyer”.244  
We can then begin to address the dilemmas that arise for the traditional 
client-directed lawyer for children. 
 
A.   Moving Beyond Paternalism and Eliminating the Language of “Best-
Interest Lawyer” 
  
Adherence to paternalism in the representation of children has impeded 
and continues to impede the progression of the juvenile dependency court 
into a rights-based legal system.245  In order to reach the goal of effective 
lawyering for children, the legal community must abandon the parens patriae 
approach to representation and remove the “best-interest lawyer” language 
from our discourse.246  Congress must amend CAPTA to require legal 
representation, not simply guardian ad litem representation.  Judges and 
lawyers must eliminate the idea that lawyers for children can engage in best-
interests representation.   
States however persist in allowing the hybrid best-interest lawyer 
model.247  States require an attorney to act as a guardian ad litem and 
represent the best interests of the child because essentially they kill two birds 
with one stone.  With the appointment of an attorney as a guardian ad litem, 
states can satisfy the CAPTA requirement for a guardian ad litem and also 
satisfy the judicial concern for the child’s constitutional right to counsel.  If 
Congress were to amend CAPTA, the need for the guardian ad litem would 
be eliminated, and thus, the hybrid approach could be abandoned in favor of 
a traditional client-directed attorney model.  Even without a Congressional 
amendment, state legislatures can eliminate the best interest language and 
provide only that lawyers be appointed to represent children.248   
Legislatures should not instruct lawyers how to represent their clients.249  
Lawyers must be guided by the standards issued by the bar and determine 
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their role independent of legislative mandates.250 
In order to eliminate the best-interest lawyer model, lawyers, legislatures, 
courts, and scholars must also abandon the paternalistic approach to 
representing children in dependency proceedings.  Paternalism is the driving 
force behind the best-interest model.251  But paternalism has no place in a 
rights-based system, and must give way to advocacy.252  If we accept the 
premise that children have due process rights in dependency proceedings, 
children must have traditional legal representation.253  Representation by a 
guardian ad litem or a lawyer acting as a guardian ad litem, who substitutes 
his judgment for that of the client, does not suffice to protect legal interests 
and rights of parties to proceedings.254  
The difficulty in overcoming paternalism comes when the child client is 
too young or otherwise incapable of directing her lawyer, as well as when the 
child’s positions diverge from what the lawyer views as her best interests. 
 
B.   Dealing with the Dilemma of a Client Who Lacks Capacity and Whose 
Objectives Are Not in His or Her Best Interests 
 
The debate about the role of lawyers for children inevitably circles back 
to two main questions.  What is a lawyer to do when: (1) a child is too young, 
immature, or otherwise lacks the capacity to direct her lawyer; and (2) a child 
expresses a desire for an outcome that would likely be harmful to the 
child?255 
Some scholars recommend that when child clients are too young to direct 
their lawyers, they be represented only by a guardian ad litem.256  However, 
children develop differently and mature at different ages.257  Children differ 
in their capacity for understanding their situation and for expressing their 
desires.258  Some very young children can participate in their cases, express 
their thoughts, and speak with their lawyer.259  Some adolescent children 
cannot assist their lawyer due to mental disabilities or lack of judgment.260  
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Thus, there is difficulty in establishing a specific age at which children 
should receive representation in the form of a guardian ad litem in lieu of an 
attorney.   
Some scholars recommend that a guardian ad litem be appointed for all 
children and that the guardian ad litem request the appointment of an 
attorney when the child’s preferences differ from the guardian ad litem’s 
opinion.261  Other scholars recommend that an attorney be appointed for all 
children and that the attorney request the appointment of a guardian ad litem 
when the child seeks an outcome that would be harmful.262  Still others 
recommend that the court specify an age before which children do not 
receive lawyers.263  Here again, the age range differs—some scholars put the 
age at seven and others, lower.264 
The debate can only be resolved by removing the guardian ad litem form 
of representation and allowing lawyers to proceed under the rules of 
professional conduct and the standards promulgated by the bar.265  In the 
context of the debate surrounding the role of children, this seems to be a 
drastic step.  How can lawyers represent children who cannot articulate their 
position or who ask for something that might place them in harm’s way?  It 
may seem difficult for scholars, judges, and legislatures to envision the 
representation of children without the lens of paternalism. 
But for lawyers in other areas of practice, removal of the parens patriae 
lens is more a matter of routine and necessity to comply with the goal of 
advocacy. 
Clients often seek outcomes in cases that are not practical, that may be 
harmful, or that may be unsupported by the evidence or law in the case.266  
Clients often refuse to settle a matter when it would be in their best interests 
to do so.267  Clients often ask their lawyers to take action that is unsupported 
in the facts of the case or the law.268  Clients often cannot articulate their 
positions in the case beyond a generalized goal.269 
Attorneys are capable of dealing with incompetence or impaired 
judgment on the part of clients.  For example, many criminal defendants 
suffer from mental illness or deficiency.  Many criminal defendants express 
the desire to be set free from the criminal charges, but they disagree with 
their lawyers about strategy, plea negotiations, and other actions that would 
be in their best interests.  In the criminal defense arena, the role of the lawyer 
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is to provide zealous advocacy within the parameters of the law and ethics.270  
The essential relationship between lawyer and client is that of an advocate 
for the client and respect for the client’s positions.271  Within that role, and 
pursuant to MRPC Rule 1.2, the lawyer must abide by the client’s positions 
concerning the objectives of the representation.272   
When a client suffers from an impairment which affects his or her ability 
to make reasoned decisions, MRPC Rule 1.14 instructs the lawyer to 
maintain a normal client-lawyer relationship with the client, as far as 
reasonably possible.273  Although the Rule provides little guidance to the 
lawyer on how to accomplish this, lawyers can look to other Model Rules to 
deal with the impaired client.274  For example, when a lawyer has difficulty 
maintaining a normal client-lawyer relationship with a client due to 
impairment, the lawyer can rely on information from family members, expert 
witnesses, and other professionals who treat, or have contact with, the 
client.275  MRPC Rule 2.1 provides parameters for the lawyer to take on an 
advisor role.276  MRPC Rule 1.4 also requires the lawyer to communicate 
with the client.277  Lawyers can, and should, continue to protect the legal 
interests of clients who have difficulty expressing their positions.278  In child 
dependency cases, lawyers can advocate for the least restrictive intervention 
by the state and for preservation of the family unit.279 
Regardless of competency, clients generally control the goals of 
litigation but not necessarily the means by which those goals are achieved.280  
Lawyers have some latitude to make decisions about matters that are 
strategic, rather than fundamental, regardless of the client’s preferences.281  
In fact, lawyers necessarily often make strategic decisions without client 
input.  As long as the lawyer is advancing the client’s objectives and takes 
into consideration the client’s concerns, a lawyer is authorized to make 
strategic and tactical decisions based upon an investigation of law and facts 
relevant to the case.282  Although there is not always a clear distinction 
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between decisions a lawyer makes and decisions that the client makes, 283 
lawyers generally proceed upon the directive that they are to advocate for the 
clients’ stated objectives and not some notion of what the lawyers believe to 
be in the best interests of the clients.284  When there is clarity in the role that 
the lawyer plays, then the lawyer can attempt to resolve issues of client 
impairment using the same standards that govern all lawyers.285  When there 
is no consensus about the role of the lawyer, there will be a greater likelihood 
that the lawyer falls back on his or her personal opinions and values.286 
In areas of legal practice outside of child dependency, lawyers know that 
they must be first and foremost zealous advocates, and thus, the dilemma of 
what to do when the client is impaired, at minimum, can be addressed by 
looking to ethical rules and by engaging in the professional skills in which 
lawyers are trained.  When lawyers for children are instructed to represent 
the best interests of the child and act as guardians ad litem, the ethical 
analysis becomes muddled. 
When a child client is capable of communicating with his or her lawyer, 
but expresses a preference for an outcome that would likely result in harm, 
the lawyer faces an equally if not more difficult dilemma than when the child 
is incapable of communicating a position.  But clients with bad judgment are 
also part of the daily life of lawyers.  Even in the situation of a child, lawyers 
must advocate and leave decision making to judges.287  Lawyers cannot allow 
paternalism to take hold and pursue what they personally believe to be in the 
client’s best interests.288  Theoretically, this premise is hard to swallow, 
particularly in the case of a child who may be facing abuse in the home. 
But, in reality, lawyers cannot change facts and are ethically obligated to 
only present arguments that are based in law.  No matter how vigorously a 
lawyer argues for the child to return home to an abusive parent, if the facts or 
law do not support such a decision, a judge will not necessarily follow the 
lawyer’s recommendation.289  The child’s lawyer is one of several attorneys 
involved in the case.290  The state agency’s lawyer will generally have the 
burden and the resources to present evidence or testimony regarding the 
nature of the abuse or neglect.291  The parents may each have their own 
lawyer and may have opposing positions to each other.292  One parent may 
agree with the state agency’s position and point the finger at the other parent.  
                                                 
 283. Slobogin & Mashburn, supra note 280, at 1630; see also Richard J. Bonnie, The Competence of 
Criminal Defendants: Beyond Dusky and Drope, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 539, 569-70 (1993).  
 284. Uphoff, supra note 269, at 106. 
 285. Bernabe, supra note 6, at 870.  
 286. Id.  
 287. Guggenheim I, supra note 5, at 80–83. 
 288. Id. 
 289. Id. at 103–05. 
 290. Id. 
 291. Id. 
 292. Id. 
2013           BEYOND PATERNALISM   127
The judge is not bound by any party’s single voice.293  The adversarial 
system contains the necessary procedural checks and balances designed to 
produce an informed decision based upon the evidence.294  The system 
requires an impartial judge and zealous advocates to reach the goal of 
“reasoned, informed decisions upon full evidentiary review”.295   
The theoretical difficulty with advocacy that may put a client in harm’s 
way is no different than the lawyer’s moral dilemma in other types of cases.  
Lawyers must embrace the advisor role and vigorously counsel their clients.  
When a client seeks a result that would be unlikely to occur or would be 
harmful to him or her, it is the lawyer’s duty and obligation to counsel the 
client.296  It is incumbent upon the attorney to explain the law, the facts, and 
the likelihood of success or failure of the client’s goals.  If a client continues 
to seek an objective that would be unlikely or harmful, the lawyer has 
options.  The lawyer can refuse to take action that would be frivolous under 
the law, ask for the appointment of a guardian ad litem for incompetent 
clients, or seek withdrawal from representation.297  While such options are 
not ideal, they are acceptable.  Lawyers for children must first work to 
counsel and to advise their clients about the consequences of certain courses 
of action.  As a last resort, when all else fails, lawyers can proceed with an 
alternative. 
In order to assist lawyers in resolving the dilemmas of incompetence or 
impaired judgment on the part of clients, we must look to ethical rules and 
bar standards that govern lawyers.298  We must look at how lawyers in other 
arenas, such as criminal defense, handle such dilemmas.  When formulating 
guidelines or standards for lawyers for children in abuse and neglect 
proceedings, the distinction between client-directed and best-interest lawyers 
must be abandoned.  If the legislature and the bar continue to permit the 
appointment of counsel under either model, courts will continue to rely on 
lawyers to advocate for what they believe to be in the best interests of the 
child, rather than allowing the lawyers to advocate for their clients’ 





Lawyers for children in juvenile dependency proceedings currently 
receive inconsistent and unclear directives on their role.  Lawyers for 
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dependent children are routinely instructed and are expected to act in the role 
of guardians ad litem, rather than the role of advocates for which they are 
trained.  The result is ineffective lawyering that fails to protect the due 
process rights and liberty interests of abused and neglected children.   
In the forty-five years since the decision in In re Gault and the thirty-
eight years since the passage of CAPTA, we are still debating about how 
lawyers are to represent children in dependency proceedings.  As long as we 
continue to instruct lawyers to act as guardians ad litem, we continue to try to 
fit a square peg into a round hole.  And until we move beyond paternalism, 
we cannot reach the goal of effective representation for abused and neglected 
children. 
 
 
